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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Must Weber County provide public notice and a hearing under 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303,304 & 305 prior to selling a park property which 
was covered by the County's "general plan"? 
2. Where Weber County failed to provide the statutorily-required 
public notice and a hearing before the sale, does that failure result in a 30-day 
statute of limitations to challenge illegal acts never being triggered? 
3. Does the fact that the purchaser claims he is not "changing the 
use" of the property excuse Weber County from the relevant statutes requiring 
notice and a hearing for the sale of general plan property? 
ORDER OF SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
The Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
was entered by the Honorable Michael Lyon, Judge of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Ogden, on January 17, 2001, Civil No. 990907314. R. 701. 
The same Order denied Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
District Court entered a written opinion on December 29, 2000. R. 684. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The opinion of the Second District Court was filed 
December 29,2000, and an Order granting Appellees' summary judgment was 
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entered on January 17,2001. R. 682-700, R. 701 -704. Appellants filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal on February 14, 2001. R. 708-714. 
CONTROLLING REGULATORY & STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
At the time of the Weber County Commission's sale of the WCPP 
to Rulon Jones on March 11, 1997, the following statutory provisions of the 
County Land Use Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA") were in 
effect: 
1. Acts Requiring that the General Plan Be Amended. 
17-27-305. Effect of the plan on public uses. 
(1) After the legislative body has adopted a general plan or any 
amendments to the general plan, no street, park, or other public 
way, ground, place, or space, no publicly owned building or 
structure, and no public utility, whether publicly or privately 
owned, may be constructed or authorized until and unless: 
(a) it conforms to the plan; or 
(b) it has been considered by the planning commission and, 
after receiving the advice of the planning commission, approved by 
the legislative body as an amendment to the general plan. 
(2) (a) Before accepting, widening, removing, extending, 
relocating, narrowing, vacating, abandoning, changing the use, 
acquiring land for, or selling or leasing any street or other public 
way, ground, place, property, or structure, the legislative body shall 
submit the proposal to the planning commission for its review and 
recommendations. 
(b) If the legislative body approves any of the items 
contained in Subsection (a), it shall also amend the general plan. 
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2. Amendment of General Plan, 
17-27-304. Amendment of plan. 
The legislative body may amend the general plan by following the 
procedures required by Section 17-27-303. 
3. Public Notice and Hearing Required to Amend GP. 
17-27-303. Plan adoption. 
(1) (a) After completing a proposed general plan for all or part 
of the area within the county, the planning commission shall 
schedule and hold a public hearing on the proposed plan. 
(b) The planning commission shall provide reasonable notice 
of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
(c) After the public hearing, the planning commission may 
make changes to the proposed general plan. 
(2) The planning commission shall then forward the proposed 
general plan to the legislative body. 
(3) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the 
proposed general plan recommended to it by the planning 
commission. 
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of 
the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
(4) After the public hearing, the legislative body may make any 
modifications to the proposed general plan that it considers 
appropriate. 
(5) The legislative body may: 
(a) adopt the proposed general plan without amendment; 
(b) amend the proposed general plan and adopt or rej ect it as 
amended; or 
(c) reject the proposed general plan. 
These statutes are attached in the Record at 472. 
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4. Statute of Limitations. 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land 
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made 
under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted all 
administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made 
in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days 
after the local decision is rendered. 
CONTROLLING CASE LAW 
The outcome of this case is controlled by this Court's decision in 
Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 9 P.3d 762, 2000 UT 69 (Utah 2000). 
ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMONLY USED TERMS 
"The Citizens" = The named appellants herein, who are residents 
and taxpayers of Weber County, State of Utah. 
"CLUDMA" = County Land Use Development and Management 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, etseq. 
"GP" = General Plan, or the specific general plan adopted by 
Weber County for the Ogden Valley (Huntsville, Eden, and Liberty) in October, 
1996. 
"GP Property" = Land, the use or disposition of which is covered 
by a General plan. 
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"Rulon Jones" = A prominent citizen of Weber County and a 
resident of Eden, in the Ogden Valley. 
"Commissioner Glen Burton" = The Weber County Commis-
sioner who proposed the sale to Jones. 
"R.O.W." = Right of way. 
"S.O.L," = Statute of limitations. 
"WCPP" = Wolf Creek Park Property (the "subject property"). 
"David Wilson, Esq." = The Deputy Weber County Attorney who 
apparently advised the County regarding this sale to Jones. 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case deals with the statutory interpretation of three CLUDMA 
statutes, and whether Weber County must first provide public notice and hold 
a hearing prior to selling a park property covered by the County's general plan. 
The 160-acre WCPP was sold to Rulon Jones in March, 1997, without public 
notice and a hearing, and shortly thereafter the Citizens (plaintiffs herein) began 
efforts to persuade the County to reverse this sale. They filed the current action 
in October, 1999, asking the court to declare the sale illegal and void. R. 1. The 
County moved for judgment on the pleadings and Rulon Jones moved to 
dismiss. R. 64, 137. After a lengthy period of briefing on these motions, the 
court determined that there was enough basis to defer ruling on the motions, and 
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allowed discovery to go forward. R. 436. After the conclusion of discovery, all 
the parties moved anew for summary judgment. R. 465, 564 and 578. 
The court heard argument on the respective motions for summary 
judgment on November 9,2000. There were some supplementary briefs filed. 
R. 675,678. On December 29,2000, the court issued its memorandum decision 
on the motions, denying the Citizens' motion for summary judgment, and 
granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. R. 682. An order was 
later entered and a timely notice of appeal was filed. R. 701, 708. 
During the course of the litigation, the main issue emerged as to 
whether certain CLUDMA statutes required referral to the planning commission 
and public notice and a hearing before this property could be sold. Even though 
there were certain unresolved factual issues such as whether the property was 
sold for a fair price at $200 an acre, the case was ripe for summary judgment 
because the main issue was one of statutory interpretation, specifically whether 
a statute required notice and hearing before the sale. If this Court sustains 
plaintiffs' position that notice and a hearing was required for the sale, then the 
sale is void regardless of the price paid. 
// 
// 
/ / 
/ / 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts, essentially undisputed, are relevant for the 
determination of this case: 
1. General Plan Adopted - Characteristics of Property, The 
Weber County Commission adopted a General Plan on October 2,1996. See R. 
509-518. The subject property, sometimes known and referred to as the "Wolf 
Creek Park Property" ("WCPP"), had 11 separate physical characteristics that 
made it GP Property. R. 513-515. See Point I. A, infra, for a discussion of the 
11 characteristics. The WCPP is located about 2x/2 miles north of the Wolf 
Creek road which leads to Powder Mountain Ski Resort. See Map, R. 522,524. 
The WCPP actually borders on the resort property. Id. It is comprised of 160 
undeveloped acres just west of the ski resort, and is accessed by a 30f right-of-
way (R.O. W.) through some pristine and scenic country. The parties admit that 
the General Plan ("GP") embraced the WCPP. WilsonDepo. 52:14-53:161;R. 
684, No. 6. A picture of the property is attached hereto as Addendum 1; R. 563. 
2. Property Considered a "Park" for Many Years, The subj ect 
property had been treated for years by County officials and the public as a 
"Park." In fact, a map in County offices designates the property as "Park." R. 
673-674, Addendum 4. The public used the property for many years for 
hereafter, deposition excerpts will omit the word "Depo." Most of the 
deposition citations herein were cited to the lower court and attached to memoranda. 
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hunting, fishing, hiking and other assorted recreational-type activities. R. 174. 
Two of the plaintiffs had used the property for those types of activities for 
approximately fifty years. R. 174. 
3. No Public Notice or Hearing for the Sale. The County did 
not provide notice or hearing for the sale of the WCPP. Wilson 90:20-91:12, R. 
536. This was confirmed by the trial court. R. 684, No. 5. Commissioner 
Burton does not recall ever having approved a similar sale of public property 
without a public hearing and a notice. Burton 32-33, R. 554-5. Deputy Weber 
County Attorney David Wilson unapologetically affirmed that none of the 
above-mentioned notice and hearing requirements were followed by the County: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: Now, you would agree that this particular 
statute (§ 17-27-303) was not complied with or followed in this 
case? 
A [Mr. Wilson]: Yes. 
Q: That's true? 
A: That's true. 
Q: It was not followed. And there was no referral to the 
planning commission? 
A: No. 
Q: And there was no 14 ~ because it wasn't referred, there 
was no 14-day notice and a hearing by the planning commission? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And there was no 14-day advance notice or hearing by the 
planning [sic - "county"] commission, right? 
A: That's correct. 
Wilson 90:20-91:10 [typo corrected], R. 536. 
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4. No Referral to Planning Commission, The proposed sale to 
Jones was not referred to the Planning Commission. Burton 68-71, R. 559; 
Laird 67-68, R. 545. 
5. Only Jones Knew Property Was for Sale. At the time of the 
sale, Rulon Jones was the only member of the public who knew that the WCPP 
was for sale. Director of Operations Gary Laird testified: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: But, I mean, you only had at that point, when 
you boil all these facts down and push away the cobwebs here, you 
had an offer by one purchaser, and as far as you knew at that time 
there was nobody else that was aware that it was for sale. Isn't 
that true? 
A [Mr. Laird]: That's true. 
Laird 63:8-13 (emphasis added), R. 544. Jones is a prominent and controversial 
resident of the community.2 
6. No Public Hearing for R.O.W. Vacation. There was no 
public notice or hearing for the vacation of the 214 mile R.O.W. that led to the 
subject property. Burton 43:12-45:7, R. 557. 
7. Discussion Between Jones and Commissioner Burton Began 
Before Approval of Method of Disposition. Commissioner Burton discussed 
the sale of the property with Rulon Jones at a funeral sometime between the end 
2Jones, a former NFL linebacker for the Denver Broncos, owns or leases about 
10,000 mountain acres in the Ogden Valley, surrounding the subject property, which 
he uses as a private hunting preserve. R. 562. Customers hunt trophy elk on a fenced 
portion of the acreage about a half mile west of the WCPP, and stay at a private hunting 
lodge on top of the mountain. 
9 
of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. Burton 14:1-2, R. 550. This was prior to 
approval by the Commission of the means of disposition. 
8. Plat Map Shows Public Right-of-Way. In or about 1972, 
Weber County recorded a plat map with a public R.O.W. detailed in the deed 
and on the recorded plat map. R. 522-5. This plat map was therefore in effect 
on March 11, 1997, and clearly showed the existence of a 2Vz mile public 
R.O.W. from the Powder Mountain Road to the WCPP. R. 522-5. The R.O.W. 
is clearly GP Property ("any street or other public way") under § 17-27-305. 
9. Deed to Jones Purports to Convey Public R.O.W. In 1997, 
the County's Quit Claim Deed of the WCPP to Rulon Jones conveyed "any and 
all right, title and interest it now possesses in the below described tract of land 
to Rulon K. Jones," and specifically included the R.O.W.: "Together with all 
rights and obligations relative to ingress and egress as granted to Weber 
County by deed from Alvin F. and June H. Cobabe." R. 526 (emphasis added); 
Addendum 2. 
10. The WCPP R.O.W. Was a "Street." CLUDMA defines a 
street as "public rights-of-way, including... lanes, walks,... public easements, 
and other ways." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(s). The WCPP R.O.W. was thus 
clearly a "street" under Utah law. 
11. Recorded Map Operated as Public Dedication of R.O.W. 
On March 11,1997, at the time of the Quit Claim Deed from Weber County to 
10 
Jones, another CLUDMA statute provided that "maps and plats, when made, 
acknowledged, filed and recorded according to the procedures specified in this 
part, operate as a dedication of all streets and other public places, and vest the 
fee in those parcels of land in the county for the public for the uses named or 
intended in those maps or plats.55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-807(1) (as amended 
in 1991, emphasis added). Accordingly, the WCPP was a "park" and the 
R.O.W. was a "street," and were "dedicated" to the County for public use. 
12. Notice and Public Hearing Required to Sell Public R.O.W, 
Before the County legislative body may "consider any proposed vacation, 
alteration . . . of.. . any portion of a subdivision plat, or any street, lot, or alley 
contained in a subdivision plat," there must be a public notice and hearing, 
after receiving the Planning Commission's recommendations. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-808(l)(a) and (b), § 17-27-808(2)(a) (b) and 808(6). No referral was 
ever made to the Planning Commission of the proposed vacation or sale of the 
R.O.W., nor was there public notice.and a hearing. Burton 69:8-71:16, R. 559; 
Laird 73:1-24, R. 547; and Wilson 90:20-91:12, R. 536. 
13. No Outside Independent Appraisal on This Sale. There was 
no outside, independent appraisal done of the property prior to the sale to Jones. 
Mr. Laird testified: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: And you have no one who has actually 
appraised that property. So you don't know what it is worth for 
sure, do you? 
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A [Mr. Laird]: Not that specific property. 
Laird 62:13-16, R. 544. The only appraisal Laird had available was an appraisal 
on totally different property in the North Fork area. Laird 66:5-12, R. 545. 
14. No Advertising or Determination of Value. The property was 
not advertised for public sale, so it is very difficult to get the highest and best 
value for the County. R. 544, 540. Laird testified: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: If your objective is to get the highest and best 
price for a piece of property, give me an example where you can 
get the highest and best price with fewer people knowing about 
[it] than more people. 
A: I can Jt think of one. 
Laird 22:6-16 (emphasis added), R. 541. Laird recommended selling the WCPP 
for $200 an acre based only upon the "Peterson appraisal" of property in North 
Fork, many miles away, and Jones' own statement of value. This was the 
colloquy: 
Q: So the only source of information you had was, one, your 
own eyeball of the property, which you didn't determine any value 
from; you had, two, the Chris Peterson appraisal, the Sinclair 
appraisal; and three, jww hadRulon JonesJ statement of value. Is 
that a fair statement that that's the sources of information you 
relied upon in advising the county commission? 
A: Yes. 
Laird 54:25-55:8 (emphasis added), R. 542. The County Assessors' Office had 
a number of professional assessors who were capable of assessing the value of 
the WCPP, but they were not used. Laird 55-57, R. 542-3. 
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15. No Damage to Jones. It is clear that Jones would not be 
damaged if this sale were voided. Jones owns or leases about 10,000 acres for 
his Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit ("CWMU"), and the WCPP is only 
about 1.6% (160 acres) ofthe total. Jones 13:20,R. 562. If the sale were voided 
by the Court, the only minor drawback would be his inability to exclude the 
public from the 160 acres during private hunts. Jones 14-16, R. 562. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
-- Notice and Hearing Required — 
THE SALE OF THIS GENERAL PLAN PROPERTY WAS 
ILLEGAL AND VOID BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED 
TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE AND A HEARING PRIOR 
TO SALE AS REQUIRED BY STATE LAW. AS A RESULT, 
THE 30-DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NEVER 
TRIGGERED. 
A. WCPP Is Covered Bv a General Plan. 
Pursuant to CLUDMA, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, et. seq., the 
Weber County Commission adopted a "General Plan" (GP) for Ogden Valley 
with Resolution 46-96 on October 2,1996. See Addendum 3, R. 509-518. The 
Plan's objective is "to accomplish protection of the slopes, ridgelines, 
view/entry corridors, wildlife habitat, pineview reservoir, and stream corridors." 
Id. at p. 1 Tf 7. The GP generally includes the communities of Huntsville, Eden 
and all ofthe area ten miles east of Ogden "ringed by mountains." Id., p. 2 
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1} 1.01. Section Four of the General Plan sets forth policies to protect "sensitive 
lands." See Addendum 3, p. 5 \ 3.01. The WCPP is 160 acres of undeveloped 
forest and mountain valley land west of Powder Mountain Resort within the 
Ogden Valley and includes at least the following 11 qualifying criteria: "open 
space," "sensitive lands," "wildlife habitat," a "recreational asset[ ]" or 
"facility," "suitable for community parks, campgrounds, or trail systems," "steep 
slopes (>30%)," "ridge lines," "riparian areas," important "watershed," and 
"stream corridor." The parties admit that the General plan embraced the WCPP. 
See Fact 1; R. 531; R. 672-4. 
Incidentally, defendants successfully argued below that because the 
property had a "recreational use" before the sale to Jones, and Jones allegedly 
intended a recreational use afterward, there was no change in the "use," so the 
General plan was never implicated. The trial court accepted this argument and 
based its opinion upon it. R. 684, No. 7; R. 690 ("the county's sale of property 
to Jones did not change the recreational use of the property under the plan;"). 
This will be addressed in more detail later. However, it is clear that the WCPP 
was GP Property for more reasons than simply its "recreational" use. It easily 
satisfied all of the 11 criteria set forth above, which plaintiffs argued early and 
often. R. 107-8, 484-5. The court was required to construe all reasonable 
inferences opposing summary judgment in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing it. Dairy Prod. Servs. v. City ofWellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 587 (Utah 
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2000). Therefore, conceptually, it was error for the trial court to construe the 
"use" of the property prior to the sale to Jones as simply "recreational," when 
it had many other "uses" as well. 
B. Subject Property is a "Park". 
A Weber County map defines the WCPP as "Park." R. 672-674, 
Addendum 4. The original map, which is fairly large, is the front and back of 
one sheet, and is entitled, "Ogden Valley Goals and Policies." R. 672. The 
color portion of the map was originally prepared in 1967 by the Weber County 
Planning Commission. However, the legend on the right-hand center of the 
reverse side indicates that the map was reprinted and "Prepared by the Weber 
County Planning Commission," in 1984. R. 672, 673. The map shows the 
subject property in dark green at the top, left center, just to the left (west) of the 
Powder Mountain Ski Resort. R. 674. The dark green legend shows that this 
subject property was designated as a "park" as far back as 1967 (R. 673), and 
was reaffirmed as such in 1977, and again reaffirmed as of the date of the 
revised printing of the map in 1984. R. 672. 
C. Statute Required Notice and a Hearing, 
The applicable statutes unambiguously required Weber County to 
provide notice and hearing, twice, before selling subject property. The gateway 
to understanding these statutes is Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-305(2)(a) and (b), 
which read as follows: 
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(2) (a) Before accepting, widening, removing, extending, 
relocating, narrowing, vacating, abandoning, changing the use, 
acquiring land for, or selling or leasing any street or other public 
way, ground, place, property, or structure, the legislative body 
shall submit the proposal to the planning commission for its 
review and recommendations. 
(b) If the legislative body approves any of the items 
contained in Subsection (a), it shall also amend the general plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-305 (emphasis added). This is followed by two 
statutory sections which explain how to amend the plan: 
17-27-304. Amendment of plan. 
The legislative body may amend the general plan by following the 
procedures required by Section 17-27-303. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-304. 
17-27-303. Plan adoption. 
(1) (a) After completing a proposed general plan for all or part 
of the area within the county, the planning commission shall 
schedule and hold & public hearing on the proposed plan. 
(b) The planning commission shall provide reasonable notice 
of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
(c) After the public hearing, the planning commission may 
make changes to the proposed general plan. 
(2) The planning commission shall then forward the proposed 
general plan to the legislative body. 
(3) (a) The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the 
proposed general plan recommended to it by the planning 
commission. 
(b) The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of 
the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303(l)-(5) (emphasis added). 
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The analysis of Weber County's blatant violation of these 
requirements is not difficult. First, "fbjefore... selling... any. . . public way, 
ground, place, property... ," Weber County must "submit the proposal to the 
planning commission for its review and recommendations." § 17-27-305(2)( a) 
(emphasis added). Submitting the proposed sale to the Planning Commission 
is a crucial, mandatory first step. Since there was no referral to the Planning 
Commission (Facts 3, 4), the public was robbed of its initial opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process for a very important public decision, 
i.e. the sale of a beloved park. 
Since there was no referral, the County Commission did not receive 
back a "recommendation" from the Planning Commission, as contemplated by 
the Act. Had it received the required recommendation, the County Commission 
was required to either approve or disapprove of the proposed sale to Jones. A 
second notice and hearing was required for this part of the process because if 
the "legislative body" wanted to approve the sale (one "of the items contained 
in subsection (a)"), "it shall also amend the general plan." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-305(2)(b) (emphasis added). Obviously, the amendment to the GP must 
precede the sale ("before . . . selling"), and amending the General plan requires 
a 14-day advance notice and hearing by the County Commission. 
§17-27-303(3). The public thus has the protection of two notices and two 
hearings before the property could be sold. It is a simple, five step process: 
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Step 1. Referral to Planning Commission. 
Step 2. Planning Commission gives 14-day notice of public 
hearing. 
Step 3. Planning Commission holds public hearing. Makes 
recommendation. 
Step 4. County Commission gives 14-day notice of public 
hearing. 
Step 5. County Commission holds public hearing. 
An examination of the statutory language reveals that the steps are 
jurisdictional. Section 303 requires a planning commission to "schedule and 
hold a public hearing" on the proposed amendment and "provide reasonable 
notice of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing." 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303(l)(a) and (b). After the public hearing has been 
held, the planning commission "may make changes to the proposed general 
plan" and is then required to "forward the proposed general plan [amendments] 
to the legislative body." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303(l)(c) and (2). 
After completion of the Planning Commission's role, the County 
Commission must "hold a public hearing on the proposed general plan 
[amendments] recommended to it by the planning commission" and "provide 
reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 days before the date of the 
hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303(3) (bracketed word added). Following 
this second public hearing, the Weber County Commission could then "make 
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any modifications to the proposed General Plan [amendments] that it considers 
appropriate," i.e., sell the property to Jones. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-303(4) 
(bracketed word added). These requirements are manifestly jurisdictional and 
without absent strict compliance, the sale to Jones would be void. Longley v. 
Leucadia Financial Corp., 9 P.3d 762, 766 ^ f 18 (Utah 2000); Hatch v. Boulder 
Town Council, 21 P. 3d 245 f 12, 2001 Utah App.55 (Utah App. 2001); see 
also Point I.D, infra. 
D. The Trial Court's Interpretation Renders the Statute 
Nonsensical and Absurd, 
The trial court completely misread the statute, at defendants' 
urging. In a nutshell, the trial court interpreted Section 305 as requiring notice 
and a hearing only if the sale of the WCPP to Jones involved a "change in use" 
of the property by Jones. Since Jones allegedly did not contemplate a change 
in use at the time of sale, the statute did not require a GP amendment, referral 
to the Planning Commission or public notice and a hearing. According to the 
County, public notice and a hearing would be required in the future if Jones 
decides to "change the use" from "recreational." The subjective intent of the 
purchaser, therefore, governs whether a GP amendment is required: 
Q [Mr. Sykes]: It didn't trigger a general plan amendment 
specifically because the general plan did not distinguish between 
public recreational use and private recreational use? 
A [Mr. Wilson]: Yes, sir, that's correct. 
Q: That's the main reason? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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Q: And, also, the second reason is, Jones didn't disclose in 
his offer either orally or in writing any intent to change that use? 
A: That1 s correct. If he later changed it, then it would require 
review and approval by the planning commission. 
Wilson 77:10-22 (emphasis added), R. 535. 
This erroneous interpretation is reflected in the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision. R. 689-696. The trial court found the statute 
ambiguous unless it is interpreted to require notice and hearing only when the 
recreational "use" of the property is changed. R. 692-696. The trial court 
concludes that a "general plan, under state law and county ordinance, deals only 
with uses of property, . . . regardless of public or private ownership." Trial 
Court's Memorandum Decision, pp. 694-5 (emphasis in original). This position 
is manifest error since a general plan, on the face of it, does not deal "only with 
uses of property." Subsection (2) names twelve separate applications or impacts 
on public land, only one of which is "changing the use." Of the other eleven in 
Subsection (2), for example, six applications deal with a change of ownership 
interest, including: accepting, vacating, abandoning, acquiring land for, selling 
and leasing. Five other applications deal with a change in physical 
characteristics of property, including: widening, removing, extending, 
relocating and narrowing. A single application deals with "changing the use." 
Yet the court read changing the "use" as the primary thrust of statute. This is 
totally wrong. 
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This Court has held: 
a[0]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that 
the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject.55 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Payne, 72 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) 
(citations omitted), as cited in Longley, supra, at If 19. When both subsections 
of Section 305 are considered, together with the purpose and context of the 
entire general plan statute, one must reject the trial court's conclusion that the 
general plan deals only with the "uses55 of property.3 The introductory section 
of the general plan statute provides that the purpose is to "plan for . . . the 
growth and development of the land within the county or any part of the county, 
including uses of land for urbanization, . . . wildlife habitat, and other 
purposes.55 § 17-27-301(l)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, at the starting gate of 
interpretation so to speak, the main thrust of the general plan statute is "growth 
and development of the land,55 which "includ[es] uses of land.55 "Uses55 is 
employed in this threshold statute as but one of the modifiers of "growth and 
development of the land,55 but certainly not the only one. 
When one compares Subsections (1) and (2), it is evident that they 
involve different applications and purposes. For example, Subsection (1) 
Further, even if the trial court were correct, and the GP is construed to deal only 
with "uses,55 a sale of public property to a private owner, under any reasonable 
construction, must be considered a change of use. 
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applies only to the construction or authorization of public land projects such as 
streets and parks. Subsection (2), however, deals with twelve named ways in 
which the ownership or physical characteristics of public land or structures may 
be changed, only one of which is "changing the use." There are simply different 
impacts on land addressed in these Subsections. The legislature has taken pains 
to indicate unequivocally that any of the twelve specific Subsection (2) things 
done to any public way or property require an amendment of the general plan, 
which requires notice and a hearing. 
On the other hand, if you are constructing or authorizing a public 
project such as a street or a park, an amendment to the general plan and a notice 
and hearing might not be required if the project "conforms to the plan" 
(Subsection (1)), and does not implicate one of the Subsection (2) criteria. 
However, once the project is in place, none of the twelve Subsection (2) criteria 
or applications may be done to the project without amending the general plan. 
That is probably because these twelve things have a more drastic impact on the 
property. 
An example is in order. Let's take the WCPP itself (or really any 
General plan park property owned by the County). Since the County already 
owned the WCPP, and it was already a general plan property (Fact 1), it could 
do certain things to that property without amending the general plan as long as 
it "conforms to the [general] plan." Subsection (l)(a). Certain other things 
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under Subsection (2) would require an amendment, invoking the notice and 
hearing provisions. For example, let's suppose that the County decided to take 
a bulldozer to the WCPP and level out ten tent pads, and build some outhouses 
for camping. No general plan amendment or notice and hearing would be 
required under any reasonable interpretation of Subsections (1) and (2). There 
is no change in ownership interest, and no vacating, abandoning, acquiring land 
for, or selling or leasing. There is no significant change in the physical 
characteristics, and nothing is being widened, removed, extended, relocated or 
narrowed. There is no change of use (you could camp there before and after the 
hypothetical changes). There is construction of the outhouses, but in this 
particular case, it would not change any of the applications or impacts on the 
land that would trigger the need for a general plan amendment, as per the statute. 
Since the "construction" in the hypothetical "conforms to the plan," there is no 
need for a plan amendment, and therefore no notice and hearing is required.4 
This is the only reasonable interpretation of the statue. It gives 
effect to the intent of the legislature, and "the best indication of that intent is the 
statute's plain language." Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911, P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, this interpretation is not "in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of the statute," and tries "to render all parts 
4Most changes and alterations to parks and other properties already owned by 
counties and cities will not require GP amendments because the changes are not that 
extensive, like the example above. 
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thereof relevant and meaningful," avoid interpretations which are "nonsensical 
and absurd." Id. This interpretation avoids construing a statute in piecemeal 
fashion. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court's interpretation of the statutes is piecemeal, 
nonsensical and absurd. For example, the trial court finds Subsection (1) 
ambiguous because, allegedly, it is unclear what the pronoun "it" refers to in 
Subsection (l)(a) ("it conforms to the plan"). The trial court then concludes 
that "it" must refer to "land uses." R. 694-5. But this Court has inveighed 
against such "piecemeal interpretations." It is very clear that when the whole 
of Subsection (1) is read, "it" refers to "no street, park, or other public way, 
ground, place or space." Those are the things which "may be constructed or 
authorized" only if "it conforms to the plan." That is not at all ambiguous. 
Another absurdity in the Appellees' urged interpretation is their 
claim that Subsection (2) is ambiguous where it states that "before . . . selling" 
the WCPP, the County Commission "shall also amend the general plan." 
Subsection (2). Appellees' interpretation adds an implied proviso to "shall... 
amend, " so that under the County's way of looking at things, the statute means 
"shall . . . amend only if the use is changed.1" There is nothing whatsoever 
ambiguous about "before . . . selling, " and nothing to justify the adding of the 
italicized proviso. The trial court's interpretation of Subsection (1) leads it to 
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interpret "before . . . selling'5 as ambiguous; this is nonsensical and leads to an 
absurd outcome. 
This Court has counseled to avoid interpretations of statutes in 
blatant contravention of the statute's express purpose. Here, we have a purpose 
with general plans to "prepare . . . for . . . the present and future needs of the 
County/5 as well as "the growth and development of land within... any part of 
the County.55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-3 01(l)(a) and (b). In every other section 
of Chapter 27, public notice and hearings are required.5 Yet appellees urge an 
interpretation in the area of general plans that does not require notice and a 
hearing. This is irrational and quite out of sync with the rest of Chapter 27. 
Another absurd result of the trial court's piecemeal interpretation 
is the conclusion that "a change in ownership per se in Subsection (2)(a) does 
not trigger a need for amendment" because there is no change in "use." R. 696. 
This interpretation is shocking and nonsensical for several reasons. First, how 
can an important piece of ground - a park - transfer from public to private 
ownership, and not be a change in use? The public is now excluded, or can be 
5See, e.g., § 17-27-103.5 (notice of predevelopment activities); § 17-27-
200.5(2)(b) (public hearings for the establishment of townships); § 17-27-402(2) 
(public hearings on proposed zoning ordinance changes); § 17-27-703(1) (hearings by 
the board of adjustment on zoning decisions); § 17-27-802( 1) and (2) (notice and public 
hearings on enacting a subdivision ordinance; § 17-27-808 and 809 (notice and hearing 
for vacating or changing a subdivision plat). 
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excluded at the whim of the new owner, or can use the property only at the new 
owner's pleasure. That is not a change of use? 
The absurdity of this position is further highlighted when one 
considers the logical conclusion that follows. The County could sell any park, 
even the Weber County Fairgrounds, without public notice and a hearing as long 
as the new owner did not declare an intent to change the use of the property. In 
the instant case, if Jones was simply silent, or declared an intention to maintain 
the property for "recreational use," no notice or hearing would be required for 
its sale. However, if he declared an intent at the time of the sale to put a 10-
room hunting lodge on the 160 acres, fence it, and charge wealthy persons from 
New York City $ 10,000 a pop to hunt trophy elk, maybe the County would need 
to have public notice and a hearing to effect the same sale for which it would not 
need notice and a hearing if Jones kept his mouth shut.6 However, maybe Jones 
could hire a clever attorney and convince the County Commission that his 
hunting lodge was still a "recreational use" and avoid the requirement of notice 
and a hearing. The purchaser's subjective intent is a terrible, imprecise and 
serendipitous way to manage land use, particularly when there is really no 
incentive for the purchaser to speak up and declare his true intent. This proposal 
would allow valuable public lands to pass to private ownership without public 
6The public policy difficulties are further heightened if Jones waits for a few 
years and then declares his intentions to do the lodge. Who would keep track of what 
happened in 1997? Or care? 
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notice and a hearing, or defer notice and a hearing to many years later. The very 
thought of such a policy is nonsensical. 
There are other significant problems with the trial court's 
construction of the relevant statutes. First of all, the trial court gives significant 
weight to two non-related general statutes that deal with the disposal of surplus 
property. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242 provides generally that the county may 
hold, sell and lease real property. R. 689-690. Weber County also enacted an 
ordinance that provides that it may sell real property by any manner approved 
by the County Commission. Weber County Ordinance § 6-11-12. Neither 
provision requires notice and a hearing. Defendants argued below, and the trial 
court agreed, that these general provisions somehow govern over the much more 
specific provisions found in Sections 305, 304 and 303. R. 690-1. However, 
under the accepted rules of statutory construction, a specific statute, such as 
§ 17-27-305, governs over a much more general statute. Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 
616, 6221f 17, 2000 UT 19 (Utah 2000) ("a statute dealing specifically with a 
particular issue prevails over a more general statute that arguably also deals with 
the same issue"). These other provisions are of no help whatsoever in 
interpreting Section 305, and it was error for the court to use them as an aid in 
statutory construction. 
The trial court and the County also make the astonishing claim that 
this Court should rely upon the "title" to § 305 in interpreting the meaning of the 
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statute. R. 694. This is contrary to fundamental statutory interpretation. Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-13 provides that "this boldface is not law; it is intended only 
to highlight the content of each section, part, chapter or title for legislators." 
Titles are seldom an aid to interpretation of statutes. In Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997), the court stated: 
[T]his court has held that a statute's title is not part of its text and 
cannot be used as a tool of statutory construction unless the 
statute's language is ambiguous. 
M a t 521-22. 
Defendants claimed below that the fact that two of the citizen 
plaintiffs discovered this sale about a week after it had occurred somehow 
vitiates the notice and public hearing requirements. This surely cannot be. 
Defendants have a statutory duty of notice and public hearing to the public at 
large. This case is not about the five plaintiffs, alone. The fact that two or three 
members of the public knew about it hardly rectifies the lack of public notice 
that would have ensured that the public at large would be informed of this 
proposed sale long in advance. This notice and the public hearing are 
"jurisdictional," and the sale is void, as if it never took place. This Court must 
rectify the injustice. 
The Citizens' interpretation looks to the intent of the act itself, in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Evans v. Utah, 963 P.2d 
177, 184 (Utah 1998). This interpretation is reasonable because it 
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acknowledges that not every action dealing with general plan property is going 
to take an amendment; it is the extent of the effect on the property that will 
determine whether or not an amendment is required. 
E. Sale Was Void and 30-Dav S.O.L. Never Triggered, 
Utah case law supports the conclusion that the sale to Jones was 
void for failure to strictly comply with statutory notice and hearing 
requirements, and the 30-day S.O.L. was never triggered. The recent cases of 
Longley v. LeucadiaFinancial Corp., 9 P.3d 762,2000 UT 69 (Utah 2000) and 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 21 P. 3d 245 ^ 12, 2001 Utah App.55 (Utah 
App. 2001) are dispositive against the defendants on these issues. In Longley, 
Leucadia Financial Corporation, a housing developer, filed an application to 
develop water rights and was given several extensions by the State Engineer. 
Longley was also a developer in the area and was termed a "junior appropriator" 
to Leucadia, but had no property interest in the water rights. Id. at ^ 2, 9, 16. 
The State Engineer apparently granted several extensions to Leucadia to develop 
these water rights. 
The relevant statute provided that the State Engineer could give 
extensions not exceeding 14 years after the date of approval, "but extensions 
beyond 14 years shall be granted only after application and publication of 
notice. . . . The notice shall inform the public of the diligence claimed and the 
reason for the request." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(e),(f)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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Longley, f 16. The notice here was deficient, and the deficiency was crucial 
because it was silent about Leucadia's "diligence." Another statute required an 
objector like Longley to file a protest with the State Engineer within 30 days 
after the State Engineer's notice of extension for Leucadia was filed. Id. at 
fflf 9,16. The State Engineer published the notice of the fifth extension request 
by Leucadia, allowing for protest to be filed by May 14,1994, but Longley filed 
his protest in April, 1991, "almost one year after the initial closing date for 
protesting had passed . . . ."Id. at f 9. Summary judgment was granted to 
Leucadia on the basis of the 30-day S. O. L., which was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals. Id. at^j 12. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding: 
This conclusion [of the Court of Appeals] fails to take account of 
the consequences of inadequate notice. We hold that the 
deficiencies in the public notice rendered the notice invalid, and 
therefore Longley must be given the opportunity to have his 
objections to Leucadia's fifth extension request on its change 
application heard. 
Id. at f 18 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court Opinion notes that "to assure 
the equitable distribution and the most efficient use of this scarce commodity, 
the legislature has mandated procedures that include the public . . . " in the 
process of approving time extensions in that the "statute requires . . . public 
notice of a hearing." Id. at If 19. Similarly, § 17-27-305 has "mandated 
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procedures that include the public" in the process of selling GP property. Id. at 
1fl9. 
To illustrate the importance of the notice and hearing, Longley cites 
vastly different cases, Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996), cert. 
den., 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997); and Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201,1999 UT 36 f 19, (Utah 1999). In Beltran, a putative father lost custody 
rights to his child for failure to "strictly comply with the statutory requirement 
that he file notice of paternity with the Utah Department of Health." The 
legislative intent of the statute showed a strong public policy that "required strict 
adherence to statutory notice requirements." Longley, 9 P.3d at 766, \ 20. In 
Rushton, a governmental immunity case, this Court observed "strict compliance 
with notice requirements in governmental immunity cases serves an important 
public purpose." Longley, 9 P.3d at 767, ^ f 21. The Court holds: 
We perceive no reason to treat the statutory notice requirement any 
less strictly in the water rights context than we treat it in the 
putative father and governmental immunity context. The State 
Engineer, an officer of the state, occupies a position of critical 
importance and power in the execution of water policy. If the 
public has no notice of how an applicant claims to have put the 
water to beneficial use or of the reasons the applicant claims are 
the cause of significant delay, the purpose of the statutory 
scheme is defeated. The State Engineer may well be deprived of 
significant information known only to interested members of the 
public, including water users and water right holders, and the 
public will be denied its role in the process of equitable water 
development contemplated by the statute. 
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Id. at \ 22 (emphasis and double emphasis added). In the case subjudice, the 
failure of public notice and a hearing likewise defeats "the purpose of the 
statutory scheme." Id. at \ 22. It deprived the County Commissioners of 
significant information that might well have been important in deciding whether 
to sell the WCPP. 
On the other side of coin, the failure of notice denies "the public 
. . . its role in the process of equitable water development contemplated by the 
statute." Id. at 1} 22. By comparison, the citizens of Weber County were denied 
their input on the use and sale of public lands, and it is easy to see how this 
corrupted the entire process. We have the sale of 160 acres of prime recreational 
ground to Mr. Rulon Jones, who is the only member of the public who knew 
that it was for sale. Fact 5. This 160 acres bordered Powder Mountain Ski 
Resort; but was sold for $200 per acre! Such actions understandably raised a 
storm of public protest, and created suspicions of favoritism and dishonesty. A 
statutory scheme that allows this to happen makes for terrible public policy. 
Longley concludes that "this case illustrates the necessity for a 
public voice" (Id. at ^ 23) because "this is precisely the type of situation where 
the public needs to be adequately informedof... the 'diligence5... claimed." 
Id. at Tf 26 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The notice did not strictly 
comply with the statute because it did not mention the diligence claimed as a 
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reason for the delay, which was a crucial omission. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court refused to apply the statute of limitations to Longley, noting: 
Here, the legislature's intent that the public be given meaningful 
notice was not given effect. We hold that, because the public 
notice given regarding Leucadia's fifth extension request did not 
strictly comply with the statutory requirements . . . , the notice 
was invalid and the statutory time period within which Longley 
was required to protest was never triggered. . . . Because the only 
basis upon which the district court found Longley to lack standing 
to appeal was untimeliness, we hold that Longley has standing and 
his objections must be heard. 
Id. at Tf 26 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Likewise, the proposed sale 
of a GP park is "precisely the type of situation where the public needs to be 
adequately informed." Id. The failure of strict compliance with §§ 17-27-305, 
304 and 303 by Weber County means the 30-day statute of limitations "was 
never triggered." Therefore, the Citizens and other residents of Weber County, 
are still entitled to proper notice and a hearing for this sale. These Citizens have 
"standing and [their] objections must be heard." Id. at f^ 26. 
Hatch involved a town zoning ordinance, pursuant to which a 
certain company was granted conditional use permits to which plaintiffs 
objected. The issue was whether the town complied with enabling legislation 
in adopting the zoning ordinance, which required the proposed ordinance to 
include both maps and the full text, and to provide notice and public hearing on 
the same. Hatch, 21 P.3d 246 \^ 5,6. However, a map did not accompany the 
text of the zoning ordinance "when presented to the public and to the 
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municipality's legislative body for approval." Id. at % 9. The Court of Appeals 
observed that the purpose of the enabling legislation was "to ensure that 
members of the public received adequate notice of ordinances that may affect 
their property." Id. at \ 12 (emphasis added). A map that does not illustrate the 
text of the ordinance, "adequately portraying all zoning districts, does not 
provide notice to the public of the scope and intent of the proposed zoning 
ordinance." Id. at | 13 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the public notice 
requirement was not met because "the Town failed to comply strictly" by 
publishing a map as part of the notice requirements, rendering the ordinance 
invalid. Id. at f 14. 
Other cases support the proposition that an illegal act by the 
governmental entity results in failing to trigger the statute of limitations. See 
Lewis v. Kanab City, 523 P.2d 417,418-419 (Utah 1974) (ordinance for special 
improvement assessments invalid for failing to provide "for Board of 
Equalization Review"; defect was "jurisdictional" and the 30-day S.O.L. not 
triggered). Id. at 419. See also, Wells v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City 
Corp., 936 P.2d 1102,1104 (Utah 1997) (zoning variance invalidated because 
Board had "overstepped its legislatively delegated authority and, as such, its 
decision is illegal"); but compare Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506, 
511 (Utah 1990) (failure to file a routine notice did not invalidate actual notice 
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to property owners; however, "[i]n other circumstances, a failure to file a copy 
of the notice of intention and of the resolution might be fatal"). 
POINT II 
— Limitation of Action Not Applicable — 
THE 30-DAY LIMITATION PROVISION IN §17-27-1001 
DOES NOT PROHIBIT THIS ACTION, BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT SELL THE PROPERTY TO 
JONES "IN THE EXERCISE OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
THIS CHAPTER." 
Even if defendants' interpretation of § 17-27-305 were correct, i.e., 
that it dealt only with changes of use, the 30-day S.O.L. would still not apply to 
prevent the current action because defendants did not sell the property "in the 
exercise of the provisions of this Chapter." Appellees cannot have the 
protection of an Act that was ignored by them in making the sale. 
The CLUDMA statute passed in 1991. It has ten separate parts, 
some of which are subtitled "Planning Commission" (Part 2), "General Plan" 
(Part 3), "Zoning Ordinance" (Part 4), "Board of Adjustment" (Part 7), and 
"Subdivisions" (Part 8). Other parts deal with residential facilities for the 
elderly and disabled, and access to solar energy. The part dealing with "Appeals 
and Enforcement" (Part 10) comes at the very end of Chapter 27 and is 
obviously designed to deal with people who are knowingly adversely affected 
by County land use decisions that are made pursuant to Chapter 27. Section 
1001 reads: 
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17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made 
under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted all 
administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after 
the local decision is rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(1) and (2)(a) (double emphasis added). Chapter 
27 governs local land management decisions, and provides a system of appeals 
for those aggrieved by "decisions made under this chapter [27]." "Under this 
chapter" is clearly self-limiting. There is absolutely no indication in the statute 
that the S.O.L. is intended to prohibit any suit against a county for an event not 
"under this chapter." 
In this action, the Citizens complain that the County's decision to 
sell the property to Jones was not made under the Act, as it should have been. 
The decision to sell the property to Jones was not "a county's land use decision[] 
made under this chapter." § 17-27-1001(1). The County Commission admittedly 
sold the property without referring it to the Planning Commission under § 17-27-
305(2), without giving the public notice, and without holding public hearings. 
In fact, Commissioner Burton acknowledged that the sole reason for the sale of 
the property had nothing to do with land use at all; it was an urgent need to raise 
money to cover a budget shortfall of $3-400,000, and to try to avoid raising 
taxes. Burton 45, R. 557. There is absolutely no indication in this record that 
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defendants had even claimed a Chapter 27 basis for this sale, and only Chapter 
27 reasons or actions would entitle defendants to avail themselves of the 
Chapter 27 30-day S.O.L. 
Defendants have steadfastly maintained that they were not required 
to follow Subsection 305. They have claimed that they were merely selling 
surplus property under a county ordinance. Therefore, there is no complaint 
about a "decision made in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter," but the 
complaint is about a decision made outside of the Act, so that § 17-27-
1001(2)(a) does not apply. Strangely, defendants claim on the one hand that 
they can ignore one provision of the Act, Subsection 305 (notice and hearing 
requirements), but seek enforcement of a statute of limitations that applies only 
if they had done what they illegally failed to do. It is a strange paradox. 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of § 1001 is the only one that makes sense. 
Without public notice or input, the County Commission put the matter on the 
agenda in a work meeting where there are normally no formal motions made. 
Complaint f^ 38, R. 92. Jones was the only one to "bid" on purchasing the 
property. Complaint \ 38, R. 92; Toone Affidavit ]f 5, R. 174. A motion was 
made at the very same meeting to sell the property to Jones for $200/acre and a 
quit-claim deed was executed forthwith in favor of Jones. Complaint |^ 39, 
R. 93. 
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There is no indication that the general plan was ever implicated or 
considered by any party to this sale transaction. There was no notice, input, 
hearing or other due process-like public information protections which are 
loaded into Chapter 27 to protect the public at large or aggrieved landowners 
from adverse county land use decisions. There was no abutting landowner in 
this case who could be aggrieved. Toone Affidavit ^ 12, R. 176. There was no 
publishing of any intent to make this sale which could trigger objections, an 
outcry, or letters that might provide input to the decision makers. Toone 
Affidavit f^ 5, 6, R. 174. All of these types of protections are packed into 
Chapter 27, but were not available to the plaintiffs in this case because 
defendants never implicated Chapter 27. In fact, as noted by the Affidavit of 
Ben Toone, this sale did not even become public knowledge for several days. 
One of the Commissioners even claimed initially that different land, not WCPP, 
was sold. Toone Affidavit f 4, R. 174. 
Subsection 1001 was never intended to prematurely cut off the 
rights of citizens who in good faith object to an illegal decision that was not 
even made under the Act where the limitation is found. 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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POINT III 
— Strong Public Policy Requires Notice and Hearing — 
IT IS AN UNSOUND PUBLIC POLICY TO ALLOW A 
COUNTY TO SELL PUBLIC PROPERTY WITHOUT 
PUBLIC NOTICE AND A HEARING. 
The defense urges a very unsound public policy that would 
discourage openness in the sale of public lands. In this case, the County sold a 
30-year-old park to a single offeror without notice, hearings, advertising, 
bidding or an appraisal. The County now asks this Court to throw out the 
Citizens' lawsuit simply because none of those Citizens mobilized themselves 
within 30 days after the illegal sale. In effect, this would allow County 
Commissioners to violate the law without consequence so long as no one 
noticed within 30 days. It would encourage concealment - not giving public 
notice on controversial sales - since the less notice to the public, the greater the 
chance of reaching the "safe harbor" of the 30-day S.O.L. that would protect the 
illegal act from court challenge. This unsound policy would only encourage and 
reward non-compliance with statutes. In the end, it would surely encourage 
concealment of the public's business from the public. 
The trial court ruling would also eviscerate the concept of advance 
public notice if a few citizens from the amorphous public-at-large possibly had 
post-sale notice within the 30-day S.O.L. period. Defendants asked the Court 
below to find that the five named citizen plaintiffs in this case "sat on their 
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rights" because they did not file an action within 3 0 days of the March 11, 1997 
sale. The trial court validated this unsound position. R. 688. This would deny 
the rights of tens of thousands of the public at large to access public property 
simply because a few members of that public had notice of a sale after the fact. 
This Court should treat public notice requirements in a similar 
manner as personal notice where individual property rights are at issue. This 
would be good public policy. In W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals 
explained: 
It is well-established that "[tjimely and adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart 
of procedural fairness" ... Notice must be given in compliance 
with the statutory scheme and must be sufficient. 
Id. at 761-2 (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983), 
other citations omitted; emphasis added). The landowners in W. & G. Co. had 
actual notice of the RDA's determination that their properties were blighted, and 
had actively participated in numerous hearings and the like. Id. at 758-60. 
However, the Agency had failed to comply with an important statute requiring 
it to provide individual notice1 to each landowner, not just the neighborhood in 
general, that their individual properties had been determined to be blighted. Id. 
7
"In the context of this proceeding,/**//- notice that would trigger the statute of 
limitation requires that Landowners be apprized that their property would be the 
subject of specific redevelopment activity under the proposed plan." Id. at 762. 
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Lack of advance notice and the opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way knocks out the short S.O.L.: 
If adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard are not given, 
the proceedings are void and those not properly notified are not 
bound by the proceedings because the giving of such notice is 
jurisdictional. . . . Therefore, the RDA's proceedings 
condemning Block 57 properties are void as to Landowners. 
Thus, the statute of limitations never became applicable to 
Landowners, and the RDA 's argument fails. 
W. & G. Co., 802 P.2d at 765 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The 
statutory public notice and hearing under §§ 17-27-305, 304 and 303 is 
functionally equivalent to the statutory "notice" to landowners in W. G. & Co. 
The Utah Supreme Court has elsewhere clearly upheld the 
requirement of notice for the sale of public property. Stone v. Salt Lake City, 
356 P.2d 631 (Utah I960), involved the sale of two parcels of land by a city. 
The Court made reference to Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8, which stated that a city 
may vacate a street by public ordinance. Although the Court determined the land 
in question did not specifically fall under that statute, certain procedural 
requirements need to be followed in the sale of all public lands: 
We are entirely in accord with the contention that it is desirable 
and proper that sales of such public property be openly and fairly 
conducted. The essential of procedural requirements of that 
character is that there be notice, a reasonable opportunity for 
those interested to appear and be heard, and that fairness in the 
procedure in connection with the sale be observed. . . . [The 
City's] procedure in publicizing the proposal, holding a public 
hearing, adopting a resolution declaring the property obsolete and 
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soliciting bids for its sale encompasses the basic elements of 
propriety in dealing with such public business. 
Id. at 636 (emphasis and double emphasis added). 
Every citizen has two dimensions of rights: private and public. The 
right to notice with respect to a citizen5 s private property rights is guarded by the 
Constitutional right of procedural due process. However, that same citizen also 
has very important concerns dealing with the access to public lands, and those 
rights are protected by statutory notice and public hearings. As our population 
grows, particularly along the Wasatch Front, access to recreational property 
becomes extremely important to the 90% that live in urban areas. One could be 
sitting in an Ogden office at 3:00 p.m., and be on the subject property at 5:00 
p.m. (and that is walking the 2.5 mile R.O.W., not horseback riding). The fairly 
gentle trail winds through some rather spectacular country. Access to these 
precious lands is a very important value to many people in this state. It is 
certainly important to all of our grandchildren. The passage of such public lands 
to private ownership must be a public process, open to scrutiny. 
The right to public notice is entitled to protection by the law, similar 
to the type of protection afforded private property rights. That is the purpose of 
statutory notice and public hearings. And, undoubtedly, that is why the statute 
requires two notices and two hearings in this case. It is a reflection of the fact 
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that public land decisions affect us all, and affect very important values. We do 
not want them being made in haste or in secret, as this one was. 
It is nice for Jones that he can afford to buy and lease 10,000 acres 
for a private hunting preserve. However, not everyone can afford their own 
pristine enclave, which makes it all the more important that public decisions like 
this sale be protected by appropriate notice and hearing requirements. The 
public expects no less. This Court should sustain the integrity of this important 
public process. Public notice and a hearing on the sale of public property are the 
public's equivalent to individual constitutional due process rights, and must be 
carefully safeguarded. 
POINT IV 
— Notice and Hearing are Required to Sell a Public R.O.W. — 
WEBER COUNTY ILLEGALLY VACATED THE R.O.W. TO 
THE WCPP BECAUSE IT FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC 
NOTICE AND A HEARING. EVEN THOUGH THIS ISSUE 
HAS BEEN ABANDONED BY DEFENDANTS, IT 
GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATES DEFENDANTS' 
VIOLATION OF STATUTORY NOTICE AND HEARING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
It is undisputed that Weber County intended to and did sell the 
2Vi mile R.O.W. to Jones, and that it did so illegally, without public notice and 
a hearing. See Facts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Plaintiffs claimed at the outset 
that this was illegal. R. 15-16. Both defendants' first response to suit was to 
move for summary relief, claiming that plaintiffs had stated no cause of action. 
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R. 64, 137. Had this relief been granted at that time, the public would have lost 
the R.O.W. 
About six months into the litigation, shortly after plaintiffs first 
raised the Section 305 notice and a hearing arguments, defendants claimed "after 
analyzing the deed and all pertinent issues, that it is both right and proper to 
keep the right of way public." R. 417. Prior to that time, the issue had been 
vigorously resisted, and Jones had even made public statements to the press to 
the effect that he owned the R.O.W. Later, in court hearings and pleadings, 
defendants took the position that despite the language of the deed, the R.O.W. 
was never conveyed. R. 64, 137. 
Plaintiffs do not want to beat a dead horse, because there is now a 
judicial admission in the record that the R.O.W. is, in fact, still public property.8 
However, defendants' conduct is tantamount to an admission that notice and a 
hearing was required for the sale of the WCPP also. It is almost Orwellian. 
First, defendants claim that Jones owns the R.O.W., by denying all of the 
allegations in the original Complaint. Then they claim to have reread the 
Complaint and now agree with plaintiffs' allegation that the R.O.W. should be 
deemed never to have been conveyed. They next claim that despite the 
unambiguous language in the deed which conveys the R.O.W., it was never 
intended to be conveyed and thus it is still owned by the County. The trial court 
8There has never been a deed back to the County from Jones, however. 
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validates this position by finding that the Quit Claim Deed "inadvertently 
conveyed the 30-foot public right-of-way," although there was absolutely no 
evidence that this conveyance was "inadvertent." R. 383 (emphasis added). 
In reality, plaintiffs helped defendants discover the unambiguous 
statutes requiring notice and a hearing to vacate an R.O.W. Plaintiffs had 
provided a map showing that the R.O.W. was dedicated to public use, and there 
was simply no way to contort this statute, because the "use" of the R.O.W. is 
irrelevant. The question is whether or not it has been vacated. 
In essence, plaintiffs had caught the defendants red-handed on this 
one and there was no retreat. They therefore gave up on this issue in the hope 
of salvaging their position on the 160 acres. However, as the Court can clearly 
see, the issues are identical. The County intended to, and did, convey both the 
160 acres and the 214 mile R.O.W. There was no notice and hearing on either 
part of that conveyance. The retreat on the R.O.W. issue is tantamount to an 
admission that plaintiffs' interpretation of the notice and hearing provisions of 
Section 305 are correct. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should rule as a matter of law that the County's sale of 
the WCPP was in violation of the requirements of § 17-27-305, and therefore 
illegal. By selling the land precipitously, the County usurped a fundamental 
statutory right that citizens have in public lands, namely the right to be heard and 
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to voice their objection to the sale of such lands. Utah case law clearly holds 
that an illegal act by a governmental entity robs the entity of the ability to do the 
act in question. Thus, without first following the requisite provisions, the 
County is impotent to sell public lands and any "sale" resulting from the 
County's disregard of the law is inherently illegitimate, i.e. the sale is void as a 
matter of law. Therefore, the Court should reverse the summary judgment 
granted defendants and order the WCPP returned to County ownership. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2(K 
fe)BERT i . SYKES/ 
Attorney for Appellants 
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QUTT CLAIM DEED 
Weber County, a body corporate and politic, by and through Its duly elected clerk and with 
the approval of the Board of Weber County Commissioners hereby Quit Claims any and all 
right, title and interest It now possesses In the below described tract of land to Rufon K. 
Jones, 3542 East 4100 North, Edenf Weber County, Utah for the sum often Dollars and 
other good and valuable considerations, the following described parcel of land in Weber 
County, State of Utah, to-wft 
DESCRIPTION 23 - D44 * O0> 12-fr 
Southeast one-quarter (SE1/4) of Section 35, Township 6 North (T8N) Range 1 East 
(R1E) Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (SLB&M) Together with ail rights and obligations • 
relative to ingress and egress as granted to Weber County by deed from Aivin F..And June 
H. Cobabe to Weber County as recorded In book 1*002 at page 488 of the deed records of 
Weber County, Utah. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Approved1 by Joe H, Ritchie, Chairperson 
MAIL DEED TO; MAILTAXKOTICETO: 
0QUE CROFTSr WEBER COUNTY RECORDER 
25MttR-*7 tm AH FEE 113-00 DEP «H 
REC .FOR* RULOKX JOHES 
Tab 3 
RESOLUTION NO. 'fy; "*& 
A RESOLUTION OF THE WEBER COUNTY COMMISSION 
ADOPTING THE OGDEN VALLEY GENERAL PLAN 
WHEREAS, a General Plan is intended to serve as a guide for community decisions. Zoning 
ordinances and other implementation tools are intended to be consistent with the General Plan. 
Inevitably, as circumstances and times change, it is appropriate to amend a general plan. While 
changes to a plan should be done considered with caution after the community investment in the 
process, plan amendments are expected. A plan amendment goes through the same hearing and 
adoption process with the Planning Commission and County Commission as the original adoption 
process; and 
WHEREAS, from the beginning of the Ogden Valley Plan, participants have eloquently described 
their love for this unique mountain Valley, and desire to retain the full complement of Valley 
characteristics; and 
WHEREAS, technical analysis and a series of forums have helped develop the recommended 
policies. The proposed policies reflect the results of three days of workshops with the County 
Commission, Planning Commission and Valley Plan Committee. The policies also include revisions 
made by the Weber County Planning Commission following a series of public hearings on the initial 
draft plan. Public comment has been heard and addressed during the County Commission public 
hearing process; and 
WHEREAS, it is necessary to identify the development and land use priorities of Ogden Valley 
and establish the area's future direction relative to those issues. The policies and directions 
recommended represent a combination of priorities, objectives and strategies identified through the 
scenario development and review process; and 
WHEREAS, the growth management direction presented does not focus on developing the 
Valley as quickly as possible, nor does it represent an anti-growth approach. The purpose of these 
policies is to encourage growth to take place in a responsible and deliberate manner. Through this 
approach, the Valley can continue to grow without compromising the very things that make it a great 
place to live and visit; and 
WHEREAS, based on the analysis of the carrying capacity of the public infrastructure in Ogden 
Valley, the Valley's current zoning would allow a total number of dwelling units that far exceed the 
carrying capacity of existing infrastructure, particularly the road system. This recommended scenario 
more closely reflects an anticipated twenty-year build out that can be better sustained by the Valley/ 
pending improvements of the existing infrastructure. That capacity would allow an approximate tripling 
of existing dwelling units. Total residential land-use levels should reflect this limitation. The 
development levels identified throughout this process are based on this carrying capacity and the 
desired level of development consistent with the overall well-being of Ogden Valley; and 
WHEREAS, in order to accomplish protection of the slopes, ridgelines, view/entry corridors, 
wildlife habitat, pineview reservoir and stream corridors, policies and program should be pursued by the 
County; and 
WHEREAS, proposed sensitive lands policies include additional setbacks from areas for 
protection, special review requirements, and limitations on where development takes place or its 
appearance; 
1 
509 
NOW THEREFORE, the County hereby resolves as follows: 
SECTION ONE 
BACKGROUND 
1.01 Introduction 
Ogden Valley, Weber County, Utah, is a rural, mountain valley located on the backside of the 
Wasatch Range, approximately 10 miles east of Ogden. Ringed by mountains, its spectacular setting 
and recreational opportunities coupled with its proximity to the urban Wasatch Front has spawned 
unprecedented growth pressure. This Ogden Valley General Plan is intended to provide guidance for 
future land-use decisions by Weber County and other entities affecting Ogden Valley. 
1.02 Geography 
Ogden Valley, at 5,000 feet in elevation, has an agricultural heritage. In appearance, it remains 
an agricultural, mountain valley, with Pineview Reservoir in its lower reaches, and incorporated 
Huntsville its largest (and only incorporated) town. Other communities of Eden and Liberty on the noah 
side of the Valley give Ogden Valley a rural character that is treasured by current residents. Population 
growth throughout the 1990's has increased the residential nature of the Valley. Surrounding 
mountains provide a range of recreational opportunities, including three major ski resorts and abundant 
wildlife resources. While much of the Valley is in private ownership, substantial areas are managed by 
the U.S. Forest Service and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. 
1.03 The Ogden Valley Planning Process 
Building on a 1985 plan and prior information on the Ogden Valley, a plan for Ogden Valley 
was initiated in the Spring of 1995. The Weber County Commission, with the Planning Commission 
and the Ogden Valley Planning Central Committee selected Bear West as consultants for preparaiton of 
the Ogden Valley Plan Update. 
In early summer, 1995 more than 350 residents of Ogden Valley attended five meetings to 
identify major issues facing Ogden Valley. The top issue, according to the attending public, was 
growth and development, followed by community services and facilities, water resources, rural 
atmosphere, and natural resources. Following a review of a summary of issues from the public that 
would drive the plan development, the Planning Committee, Planning Commission and County 
Commission approved a vision statement for the Plan, and a set of goals and objectives to help guide 
plan development. A summary of that work was distributed to the participating public. 
In the fall and early winter of 1995-96, planning consultants and Weber County staff analyzed 
information on these topics and conducted a series of workshops in Ogden Valley, Workshops with 
detailed questionnaires were held on Growth and Development, Community Facilities and Services, and 
Public Lands and Recreation. Responses to those questionnaires have provided valuable input. 
In the meantime, the Weber County Commission, anticipating potential changes to policies for 
Ogden Valley land use, adopted a moratorium on consideration of any new land-use decisions on 
January 30, 1996. This moratorium expired on August 1, 1996. 
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In early 1996, the Bear West Consulting Team with the Weber County staff and the Valley Plan 
Committee formulated alternative policy and land-use alternatives for Ogden Valley within the context 
of the suitability of the resources and a carrying capacity analysis of infrastructure. Concurrently, the 
Ogden Valley Water Advisory Committee, appointed by the Weber County Commission, considered 
water issues and options for the Ogden Valley. That information was summarized in a workshop. The 
full Weber County Commission, Planning Commission, and Ogden Valley Planning Committee met wi th 
consultants and staff to arrive at a starting point for a draft on March 21-22, 1996. A second 
workshop was held on May 2 to complete draft plan discussion. 
This Plan reflects Planning Commission recommendations to the County Commissioners fol lowing a 
series of planning commission-sponsored public hearings on the initial draft plan. The final plan wil l 
reflect additional public comment, analysis, and the decision of the Weber County Commissioners. 
1.04 General Plan Adoption and Amendment Process 
On August 28, 1996, the County Commission held their public hearing on the Plan. The 
County may include some new land-use ordinances to reflect their new policy changes for Ogden 
Valley. 
A General Plan is intended to serwe as a guide for community decisions. Zoning ordinances and 
other implementation tools are intended to be consistent with the General Plan. Inevitably, as 
circumstances and times change, it.is appropriate to amend a general plan. While changes to a plan 
should be done considered wi th caution after the community investment in the process, plan 
amendments are expected. A plan amendment goes through the same hearing and adoption process 
w i th the Planning Commission and County Commission as the original adoption process. 
SECTION TWO 
OGDEN VALLEY VISION STATEMENT 
Ogden Valley is a place which 
• Values and protects its natural beauty and natural resources 
0
 Cherishes and maintains its rural atmosphere and rural lifestyle 
• Empowers its citizenry to take part in decisions affecting the Valley 
2.01 Vision Statement Narrative 
The residents of Ogden Valley care deeply about the Valley they call "home". They enjoy their 
rural lifestyle and the natural beauty that surrounds them. They are justifiably proud of the unique 
characteristics of Ogden Valley, its timeless mix of pioneer heritage, agricultural lands, recreation 
opportunities, abundant wi ldl i fe, scenic vistas, and quiet living. Visitors to the Valley are struck by its 
unspoiled character and its unassuming charm. The people of Ogden Valley value these qualities and 
recognize that protecting, preserving and fostering these qualities requires foresight and wisdom. Their 
shared affection for this Valley and their hopes for its future guide them as they embark on this 
planning process. 
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2.02 Protect the Natural Beauty and Natural Resources of the Valley 
Ogden Valley is blessed with natural beauty. Its long, rolling hills curve gracefully in their 
gradual descent into the Valley, as the oaks, maples, and aspens on the hillsides give way to the 
patchwork of sagebrush, farmlands, and fields below. Each season brings a particular aspect of the 
Valley's beauty into sharper focus. In spring, the Valley explodes with the vivid green of new growth. 
In summer, wildflowers of every imaginable color blanket the mountain hillsides. In autumn, trees 
seem ablaze with a dazzling display of red and gold leaves. In winter, a calm whiteness blankets the 
Valley, its surrounding hills, and the rugged peaks of the Wasatch Mountains. 
Water nourishes the Valley's inhabitants. The North, Middle and South Forks of the Ogden 
River meander slowly through the Valley and finally converge at Pineview Reservoir. From there the 
Ogden River, which long ago carved Ogden Canyon's steep, rugged walls, rushes down the Canyon to 
join the Weber River. The waters collected in Pineview and Causey Reservoirs lap quietly against the 
shore, glistening in the brilliant rays of the summer sun, bathing in the icy glow of the winter moon. 
There is an abundance of wildlife in the Valley. Deer, elk and moose browse on the plentiful 
vegetation. They sometimes amble into a resident's backyard, pausing to observe the Valley's human 
inhabitants before slowly moving on. Hawks lazily circle the Valley, hoping to spot their prey rustling in 
the sagebrush and scrub oak below. Wild turkeys roost in cottonwood trees along Geersten Creek, 
occasionally piercing the afternoon stillness with their guttural cries. Families of beavers paddle quietly 
in the waters of the lower Middle Fork. Rainbow and cutthroat trout dart through the clear mountain 
streams. Fish bob placidly in the reservoir waters, then suddenly leap into the air as if momentarily 
taking flight. 
Ogden Valley residents want to protect these natural resources. They want to ensure that the 
human and natural landscapes coexist harmoniously. 
2.03 Maintain the Valley's rural atmosphere and rural lifestyle 
People settle in Ogden Valley because they appreciate its rural lifestyle. Jhey enjoy the slow 
pace, the easygoing friendships with neighbors, the open spaces and the fresh air. They also enjoy the 
sense of community which bonds Valley residents together. 
The Valley towns are small and pleasant. Neighbors bump into each other at the library in 
Huntsville, exchange stories at the Shooting Star Saloon, or get together at the American Legion post. 
They join together in worship at the LDS ward houses or the St. Florence Catholic Church. Their ^ 
children attend the elementary and junior high school together. Residents respect each others' privacy 
and property rights. 
The Valley is made up of well-planned communities. Residential development does not detract 
from the Valley's rural character. There are a few commercial areas in Huntsville, Eden and Ogden 
Canyon, but the commercial developments are generally modest in size and number. Emergency and 
medical services are adequate to meet the needs of Valley residents. The Valley infrastructure keeps 
pace with the area's modest growth and conforms with the Valley's resource capabilities. 
Residents often travel to Ogden to shop; many also work there. Traffic in and out of the Valley 
is generally light during the weekdays even though a number of residents commute to Ogden for work. 
Although traffic increases considerably with the weekend influx of recreationists, it flows relatively 
smoothly. 
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Agriculture is a prominent feature of the Valley, the air is often filled wi th the low rumble of a 
tractor mowing hay. Residents may spot monks from the monastery checking their beehives for the 
sweet, sticky honey they sell in their small store. Dairy cows graze on the thick green grass in the 
Valley meadows. Alfalfa sways in the gentle breezes rolling across the fields. 
There are recreational opportunities everywhere. Parents can teach their children to fish in the 
Ogden River tributaries, teach them to ski in nearby resorts, and teach them to hunt in the Wasatch 
Mountains. Residents can hike and horseback ride the many trails which wind their way through the 
surrounding mountains and hills. They can ride mountain bikes along country roads, golf at courses in 
Nordic Valley and Wolf Creek, or camp at one of many U.S. Forest Service campgrounds. They can 
gather at the Huntsville City Park for an impromptu Softball game or a family picnic. They can even 
windsurf or waterski on Pineview Reservoir. Visitors also enjoy the recreational opportunities in the 
Valley. Lower Valley residents often spend at least a portion of their weekend in and around the 
Valley. Lower Valley residents often spend at least a portion of their weekend in and around the 
Valley. In the winter, visitors come to the Valley to ski at Snow Basin, Powder Mountain, and Nordic 
Valley. In the summer, they come to the Valley to camp, boat, and fish on Pineview and Causey 
Reservoirs and hike and bike in the Wasatch Mountains. Although these visitors do not live in the 
Valley, they appreciate its outstanding recreational resources. 
SECTION THREE 
OGDEN VALLEY GENERAL PLAN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
Section 3.01 Vision - Protect the Natural Beauty and Natural Resources of the Valley 
Goal - Protect Air Quality and Water Resources 
Objectives -
Maintain high quality of air currently experienced in the Valley 
Maintain high quality of water currently experienced in the Valley 
• Prevent groundwater contamination 
• Control erosion into surface waters 
• Reduce non-point source pollution to surface waters 
• Implement water conservation measures 
Goal - Protect Open Space and Sensitive Lands 
Objectives -
Identify and promote the preservation of open space 
• Establish mechanisms to preserve open space in the Valley 
• Identify sensitive lands within the Valley 
Ensure that development does not harm sensitive lands 
Goal - Preserve Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat 
Objectives -
Include wildlife and wildlife habitat as a review element for development proposals in 
the Valley 
Include wildlife and wildlife habitat protection as a consideration in recreation planning 
• Examine critical wildlife habitat areas and means for protecting these areas 
• Coordinate w i th the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources on development proposals that 
affect wildlife or wildlife habitat 
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Section 3.02 Vision - Maintain the Valley's Rural Atmosphere and Rural LifestyJe 
Goal - Promote a sense of Pride in the Valley's History and Heritage 
Objectives -
• Identify important hisotrical resources and landmarks 
• Encourage preservation of cultural and historical resources 
• Encourage development that is compatible with these cultural and historical resources 
Goal - Require that Development be compatible with the Valley's Rural Character and Natural 
Setting 
Objectives -
• Determine the types of residential and commercial building materials and design that 
are compatible w i th the Valley's rural character 
Identify acceptable locations for commercial development 
Determine appropriate materials and design for commercial signage 
• Identify visual resource(s) objectives and ensure that residential and commercial 
developments conform with these objectives 
• Provide sufficient flexibility in zoning ordinances for creative solutions to development 
conflicts 
Goal - Require that Development and Community Services Conform wi th the Valley's Natural 
Resource Capabilities 
Objectives -
• Identify and prioritize future capital improvements 
Determine a target development growth rate that assures that present and future 
infrastructure needs are commensurate with resource capabilities 
• Establish concurrency meausres for development and infrastructure so that 
development does not proceed without adequate infrastructure 
• Establish funding meachnism for planned infrastructure expansion 
Goal - Provide Adequate Emergency and Medical Services 
Objectives -
• Examine options for increased and improved emergency services for the Valley 
• Determine the funding necessary to finance these options and the availability of such 
funding 
• Decide whether additional emergency services are needed to meet visitor demand 
• Determine funding mechanism to support emergency services for visitors 
Goal - Promote Agr icu l tura l Land 
Objectives -
Identify and promote prime agricultural land 
• Consider agricultural land in dedicated open space planning 
• Develop means to compensate property owners for the loss of development rights on 
agricultural lands 
• Promote working farms as an integral part of the Valley's cultural heritage 
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Goal - Recognize and Respect Private Property Rights 
Objectives -
Recognize private property rights in planning and development 
Engage creative zoning solutions that protect private property rights while ensuring that 
development is compatible wi th the Valley's rural character 
• Develop a program to compensate landowners in the taking of property for public 
purposes 
Goal - Facilitate the Smooth Flow of Traffic In and Out of the Valley 
Objective -
• Engage in ongoing transportation planning for the Valley 
• Examine access alternatives 
• Target access routes for improvement or expansion to meet volume demands 
Provide safe means of transportation in and out of the Valley based on highway 
capacity levels and volume demands 
Improve safety and law enforcement on roads within the Valley 
• Determine transportation restrictions to reduce congestion and traffic volumes in the 
Valley 
• Ensure that Canyon traffic does not harm natural resource or scenic value wi th in Ogden 
Canyon 
• Provide adequate road maintenance 
Goal - Enhance Quality Recreational Opportunities 
Objective -
Identify recreational assets/facilities and activities in the Valley and determine wh ich 
faclities might be expanded to meet increased recreation demand and plan for such 
expansion 
Identify areas suitable for community parks, campgrounds, or trails systems 
Determine the amount and degree of recreational development necessary to suDDort 
high quality recreation experiences in the Valley 
Promote public/private cooperation in recreation planning 
• Coordinate w i th federal and state agencies in recreation planning 
Promote safe and responsible recreation conduct in the Valley 
Ensure that recreational activities do not harm the natural resources within the Valley 
SECTION FOUR 
OGDEN VALLEY POLICIES - SENSITIVE LANDS 
To protect the character of Ogden Valley, a central element of this Plan includes a set of policies to 
protect sensitive lands in the Valley. These policies affect a variety of resources deemed important by 
Valley residents: 
Steep Slopes ( > 3 0 % ) 
Ridgeiines 
Flood Plains 
Wetlands/Cultural Resources 
Agricultural Land 
View/Entry Corridors 
Historical/Cultural Resources 
Riparian Areas 
Watershed 
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• Groundwater Recharge Areas 
• Vegetation 
Wildlife Habitat 
• Pineview Reservoir 
To accomplish protection of these resources and values, several policies and programs are being 
pursued by the County. In some instances, existing County policies are recommended for retention or 
change. In other instances, new policies are recommended. 
Proposed sensitive lands policies include additional setbacks from areas for protection, special review 
requirements, and limitations on where development takes place or its appearance. 
Section 4.01 Slopes 
Weber County will continue to restrict development on steep or unstable slopes. The County's existing 
ordinance prohibits development on areas wtih 45% slope but considers "development credits" for the 
areas between 45% and 65% slope. 
The County's future approach will include developing an "overlay zone" identifying unbuildable slopes. 
The existing ordinance will also be amended to reflect the following: 
• no development will be allowed on slopes greater than 3 0 % 
no development credit for areas > 3 0 % slope 
• a maximum height (maximum feet above grade) for buildings on steep slopes 
• storm water management elements will be included as part of the development review 
• grading guidelines for "cross slope" cuts, grading, roads, etc. will be developed and 
adopted 
• "quality development standards" addressing location, siting, materials, height and colors 
will be developed and adopted. 
Section 4 .02 Ridgelines 
Ogden Valley residents feel that part of maintaining the Valley's natural aesthetics and unobstructed 
view corridors includes defining an appropriate level of development for the surrounding hillsides and 
ridgelines. This objective involves identifying specific ridgelines where no development would be 
allowed and adopting "development standards" for all others. 
The county's recommendation for this issue includes: 
• identifying "prominent ridgelines" and establishing "no development" areas 
• develop and adopt "quality development standards" addressing development location, 
siting, materials, height and colors 
Section 4.03 Wildlife Habitat 
The Ogden Valley area enjoys a diverse and abundant wildlife population. Valley residents enjoy 
participating in all types of wildlife-related activities and feel that wildlife and wildlife habitat should be 
considered in future development decisions. The County acknowledges State of Utah responsibilities in 
wildlife and intends to work cooperatively with the Division of Wildlife Resources in 
wildlife/development issues. The County has identified preserving critical wildlife habitat as a priority, 
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but is also sensitive to private property rights and development interests. In this light, the County will 
pursue habitat preservation studies that protect private property rights and accomplish wildlife 
"preservation" objectives. 
The County will pursue the following wildlife habitat preservation objectives: 
• identifying critical wildlife habitat areas as "conditional" development areas 
• involving the Division of Wildlife Resources in development review decisions 
• identifying and acquiring wildlife habitat easements 
encouraging the state to implement supplemental feeding programs 
acquiring critical habitat areas through Division of Wildlife Resources habitat fee 
funding 
Section 4.04 View/Entry Corridors 
Residents feel that "preserving the Valley's rural character" includes maintaining open view corridors 
and preserving the Valley's "entrance experiences." Residents feel that development should not be 
obtrusive or unduly compromise the Valley's aesthetics. 
North Ogden Divide, Trapper's Loop, and along U-39 have been identified as entry corridors. Pineview 
Reservoir has been identified as a view corridor. The following strategies will be implemented to 
preserve the aesthetic and open space qualities of these areas: 
• establishing a 100' setback for buildings along entry ail corridors 
adopting "quality development standards" addressing location, siting, materials, height, 
landscaping, and colors for ail development within identified view/entry corridors 
• restricting signage and prohibiting billboards within identified view/entry corridors 
Section 4.05 Pineview Reservoir 
Future development around Pineview Reservoir is a major concern for Valley residents and visitors. 
Most residents support establishing development setbacks and maintaining the area immediately 
adjacent to the reservoir as open space. The County, balancing these interests with those of shoreline 
property owners, have identified several strategies that allow development to take place in a manner 
that does not compromise reservoir aesthetics. 
These strategies include: 
establishing a "no development*1 setback 100' from highwater mark 
• adopting "quality development standards" addressing development location, siting, 
materials, heigh and colors for all development within the identified "reservoir" zone 
• establishing "concentric development zones" surrounding the reservoir with standards 
to protect the quality of the reservoir experience depending on how close development 
occurs to the reservoir. For example, lower building heights would be required closer to 
the reservoir. 
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Section 4.06 Historical Cultural Resources 
Ogden Valley has a rich cultural heritage. Several sites within the Valley played important roles in the 
early development of Weber County and the State of Utah. Today, the Valley's history and these 
resources continue to contribute to the Valley's charm and character, 
Specific locations identified by the County as historical/cultural sites include: 
the black smith shop 
Charde property 
Rhodes property 
brick kilns 
monastery 
Identifying and preserving Valley historical and cultural resources is an important County objective, 
Proposed implementation strategies include: 
• surveying all historical and cultural properties 
developing historical/cultural site/easement acquisition strategies 
Section 4.07 Stream Corridors 
In addition to the safety issues surrounding development along stream corridors, Ogden Valley 
residents desire to see these areas protected for aesthetic, wildlife habitat, and water quality reasons. 
The County's recommended approach includes the following implementation steps: 
• establishing setbacks of 50 ' on both sides of year round streams for any structures, 
{determined from the center of the stream) 
establishing setbacks of 75 ' on both sides of North Fork, South Fork and Middle Fork 
Rivers for any structures (determined from the center of the river} 
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Tab 4 
OGPEN VALLEY STUDY 
PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT 
PLAN INTERPRETATION 
COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
•
GROWTH AREA 
one dwelling unit per acre 
•
RECREATION RESORT 
planned unit development 
P 3 | AGRICULTURE 
fe™B one dwelling unit ptr acre 
O AGRICULTURAL SERVICE 
• 
PARKS 
VERY LOW DENSITY 
one dwelling unit per 5 acres 
MOUNTAIN AREA 
LAKES and STREAMS 
PUBLIC FACILITIES 
FUTURE ROADS 
FUTURE TRAILS 
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